We analyze the potential for an environmental monitoring agency under different regulatory missions to use multiple measures of ambient pollution levels to induce firm compliance via endogenously determined probabilistic firm-level inspections of polluting activities. Departing from previous...

This paper extends a previous analysis by Franckx (2001). We consider an inspection game between n polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency. If the cost of monitoring ambient pollution is low enough, the optimal inspection policy consists in, on the one hand, imposing the maximal...

We consider an inspection game between an arbitrary number of polluting firms and an agency who can choose to monitor ambient pollution. We obtain an equilibrium where all firms comply with the same probability and where the inspection agency inspects all firms individually if ambient pollution...

This paper aims to give a comparative analysis on the different enforcement approaches in respect to both civil and common law systems (i.e. Europe vs. USA) by analyzing some crucial aspects of their underlying normative systems. Therefore, the role of the juridical institutions in these two...

The United States and the European Union have been implementing sizeable biofuel support programmes since the beginning of the decade. Supporting the biofuel industry raises the price of the agricultural feedstock, hence increases the farmer revenue, and reduces the need for direct income...

Environmental monitoring and enforcement are controversial and incompletely understood. This survey reviews what we do and do not know about the overall effectiveness, as well as the cost effectiveness, of pollution monitoring and enforcement. We ask five key questions: what do environmental...