Ortner et al. (Manage. Account. Res. 36(1):43-50, 2017) propose the State-Contingent Relative Benefit Cost Allocation Scheme as an incentive system for risky investment decisions. The note at hand reveals the information distribution implicitly assumed within the framework of this study. Based...

I address the comments made by Ortner (Games 9(4): 93, 2018) in relation to my note 'Incentive Systems for Risky Investment Decisions Under Unknown Preferences: Ortner et al. Revisited' (Games 9(2): 26, 2018).

Ortner et al. (Manage. Account. Res. 36(1):43–50, 2017) propose the State-Contingent Relative Benefit Cost Allocation Scheme as an incentive system for risky investment decisions. The note at hand reveals the information distribution implicitly assumed within the framework of this study. Based...

I address the comments made by Ortner (Games 9(4): 93, 2018) in relation to my note “Incentive Systems for Risky Investment Decisions Under Unknown Preferences: Ortner et al. Revisited” (Games 9(2): 26, 2018).

Capital rationing is an empirically well-documented phenomenon. This constraint requires managers to make investment decisions between mutually exclusive investment opportunities. In a multiperiod agency setting, this paper analyses accounting rules that provide managerial incentives for...

This paper develops a signalling game in which the decision to raise public equity is a real option of the firm. Firms may use multiple signals to reveal their type: the timing of the IPO, the fraction of shares issued and the underpricing of shares. The model provides a tractable approach for...

We present a model adequate for investment decisions in duopolies under total hidden competition. In this competitive context all potential entrants remain unrevealed until they decide to move into the market. The value-functions and the optimal entry thresholds are derived.

We provide a real-options model of an industry in which agents time abandonment of their projects in an effort to protect their reputations. Agents delay abandonment attempting to signal quality. When a public common shock forces abandonment of a small fraction of projects irrespective of...

The owner of a real option does not have the necessary expertise to manage the investment project and needs to contract with an expert in order to exercise the real option. The potential managers (the experts) have private information about their respective cost of investing in the project. The...

In our model multiple innovators compete against each other by submitting investment proposals to an investor. The investor chooses the least expensive proposal and when to invest in it. Innovators have to provide costly effort and they learn privately the cost of investing. Multiple efforts...