We study the performance of four market protocols that lead to allocative efficiency: batch auction, continuous double auction, specialist dealership, and a hybrid of these last two. In a former study, we compared them with respect to several additional performance criteria under the assumption...

This paper studies the consequences of removing the resampling assumption from the zero-intelligence trading model in Gode and Sunder (1993). We obtain three results. First, individual rationality is no longer sufficient to attain allocative effciency in a continuous double auction; hence, the...

We study the performance of four market protocols with regard to their ability to equitably distribute the gains from trade among two groups of participants in an exchange economy. We test the protocols by running (computerized) experiments. Assuming Walrasian tatonemment as benchmark, there is...

Investors in mutual funds appear to reward disproportionately the best performing funds with large inflows while, at the same time, avoid to withdraw similar amounts from the poorly managed funds. We show that this peculiar flat-convex shape of the flow-performance curve for mutual funds can be...

We compare price dynamics of different market protocols (batch auction, continuous double auction and dealership) in an agent-based artificial exchange. In order to distinguish the effects of market architectures alone, we use a controlled environment where allocative and informational issues...

This paper studies the continuous double auction from the point of view of market engineering: we tweak a resampling rule often used for this exchange protocol and search for an improved design. We assume zero intelligence trading as a lower bound for more robust behavioral rules and look at...

We show that the effectiveness of transaction taxes depends on the market microstructure. Within our model, heterogeneous traders use a blend of technical and fundamental trading strategies to determine their orders. In addition, they may become inactive if the profitability of trading...

We study the emergence of strategic behavior in double auctions with an equal number n of buyers and sellers, under the distinct assumptions that orders are cleared simultaneously or asynchronously. The evolution of strategic behavior is modeled as a learning process driven by a genetic...

We study a modified version of the coordination game presented in [van Huyck et al., 1994], where a representative selection dynamics was proposed to explain experimental data. Assuming that the agents adjust their moves in the direction of the best response, we derive a formal analysis of the...