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Strategy-Proof Preference Aggregation and the Anonymity-Neutrality Tradeoff

Athanasoglou, Stergios; Bonkoungou, Somouaoga; Ehlers, … - 2023

the only one satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and strategy-proofness (SP). For more than two alternatives, anonymity and … concepts in an intuitive manner. Dropping anonymity and keeping neutrality, we identify and analyze the first known nontrivial … they retain their desirable properties. Dropping neutrality and keeping anonymity, we establish possibility results for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014357423

Two-stage majoritarian choice

Horan, Sean; Sprumont, Yves - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 2, pp. 521-537

We propose a class of decisive collective choice rules that rely on a linear ordering to partition the majority relation into two acyclic relations. The first of these relations is used to pare down the set of the feasible alternatives into a shortlist while the second is used to make a final...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536960

Two-stage majoritarian choice

Horan, Sean; Sprumont, Yves - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 2, pp. 521-537

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273759

Notions of anonymity for object assignment : impossibility theorems

Kondo, Hikaru; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2015

anonymity. The standard definition requires that if agents' names are permuted, their assignments should be permuted in the same … way. Since no rule satisfies this definition in this model, we introduce weaker variants, "anonymity on distinct … preferences," "pairwise-anonymity on distinct preferences," "pairwise-anonymity on distinct profiles," and "independence of others …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487558

The case for utilitarian voting

Hillinger, Claude - 2005

Utilitarian voting (UV) is defined in this paper as any voting rule that allows the voter to rank all of the alternatives by means of the scores permitted under a given voting scale. Specific UV rules that have been proposed are approval voting, allowing the scores 0, 1; range voting, allowing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440432

On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives

Lahiri, Abhinaba; Pramanik, Anup - 2017

We study strategy-proof rules for choosing between two alternatives. We consider the full preference domain which allows for indifference. In this framework, for strategy proof rules, ontoness does not imply efficiency. We weaken the requirement of efficiency to ontoness and characterizes the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011756010

Chapter Nineteen. Nonbinary Social Choice

Rajat, Deb - In: Handbook of social choice and welfare : volume 2, (pp. 335-366). 2011

Economists have used the term “nonbinary” to describe both choice functional nonbinariness (choice functions that cannot be rationalized as the maximizing outcome of a binary preference relation) and structural nonbinariness (the structure of the model dictates that pairs of alternatives do...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025189

Two-valued strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions

De Simone, Anna; Bhaskara Rao, K. P. S. - In: Games 15 (2024) 6, pp. 1-9

We present simple and direct arguments to characterize strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is of cardinality two. The underlying society is of arbitrary cardinality, and agents can be indifferent among alternatives.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015271439

Level r consensus and stable social choice

Mahajne, Muhammad; Nitsan, Shemuʾel; Volij, Oscar - 2014

We propose the concept of level r consensus as a useful property of a preference profile which considerably enhances the stability of social choice. This concept involves a weakening of unanimity, the most extreme form of consensus. It is shown that if a preference profile exhibits level r...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010356368

Condorcet domains, median graphs and the single-crossing property

Puppe, Clemens; Slinko, Arkadii - 2016

Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders with the property that, whenever the preferences of all voters of a society belong to this set, their majority relation has no cycles. We observe that, without loss of generality, every such domain can be assumed to be closed in the sense that it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011490914