The first generation models of currency crises have often been criticized because they predict that, in the absence of very large triggering shocks, currency attacks should be predictable and lead to small devaluations. This paper shows that these features of first generation models are not...

The first generation models of currency crises have often been criticized because they predict that, in the absence of very large triggering shocks, currency attacks should be predictable and lead to small devaluations. This paper shows that these features of first generation models are not...

The rst generation models of currency crises have often been criticized because they predict that, in the absence of very large triggering shocks, currency attacks should be predictable and lead to small devaluations. This paper shows that these features of rst generation models are not robust...

The first generation models of currency crises have often been criticized because they predict that, in the absence of very large triggering shocks, currency attacks should be predictable and lead to small devaluations. This paper shows that these features of first generation models are not...

The first generation models of currency crises have often been criticized because they predict that, in the absence of very large triggering shocks, currency crises should be predictable and associated with small devaluations. This paper shows that these features of first generation models are...

This paper analyzes the implications of currency crises in a model with unique equilibrium. Starting from a typical multiple equilibria model with self-fulfilling expectations we introduce noisy information, following Morris/Shin (1999). Under certain conditions for the noise parameter, all...

This paper proposes a dynamic framework to study the timing of balance of payments crises. The model incorporates two main ingredients: (i) investors have private information; (ii)investors interact in a dynamic setting, weighing the high returns on domestic assets against the incentives to pull...

In an economy with a fixed exchange rate regime that suffers a random adverse shock, we study the strategies of imperfectly and sequentially informed speculators that may trigger an endogenous devaluation before it occurs exogenously. The game played by the speculators has a unique symmetric...

This paper proposes a dynamic framework to study the timing of balance of payments crises. The model incorporates two main ingredients: (i) investors have private information; (ii)investors interact in a dynamic setting, weighing the high returns on domestic assets against the incentives to pull...

This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in a global coordination game; applications include currency attacks, bank runs, and debt crises. A unique equilibrium is known to survive when the policy is exogenously fixed. We show that, by conveying...