We analyse a model of two-sided matching and incentive contracts where expertinvestors (venture capitalists) with different monitoring capacities are matched withfirms with different levels of initial wealth. Firms do not have sufficient start-upcapital to cover their project costs and hence,...

This paper addresses the positive and normative implications of indexing risky debt to observable aggregate conditions. These issues are pursued within the context of the celebrated financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). The principal conclusions are that the...

In the financial accelerator literature pioneered by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) entrepreneurs are myopic and loans have a fixed rate of return by assumption. We relax both of these assumptions and derive the optimal lending contract for forward looking entrepreneurs who can choose a...

We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensityis endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensityand consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined bythe maximization problem of the firm. As a result,...

This paper develops a continuous-time model of liquidity provision by banks, in which customers can deposit and withdraw their funds strategically ...

This paper develops a contracting framework in order to explore the effects of credit derivatives on banks incentives to monitor loans, their incentives to intervene, and, ultimately, borrowers incentives to perform.

Empirical and experimental papers nd that high-powered incentives may re-duce performance rather than improve it; a phenomenon referred to as "chokingunder pressure". We show that competition for high ability workers neverthelessleads rms to oer high bonus payments, thereby deliberately...