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Per unit and ad valorem : royalties in a patent licensing game

Montinaro, Marta; Pal, Rupayan; Scimitore, Marcella - 2020

In a context of product innovation, we study two-part tariff licensing between a patentee and a potential rival which compete in a differentiated product market characterized by network externalities. The latter are shown to crucially affect the relative profitability of Cournot vs. Bertrand...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012306713

Consumer Surplus-enhancing Collusions, Patent Pools, and R&D

Chen, Linfeng - 2019

This study reveals two different rationales for consumer surplus-enhancing collusion. The first model considers two competitive firms in the final product market, each with one essential patent necessary for production. The equilibrium price under collusion is lower than the price under...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012894295

Auctioning process innovations when losers' bids determine royalty rates

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2010

We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935644

Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2010

scheme that combines a first-price license auction with royalty contracts for losers. Prior to bidding firms observe …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935649

License auctions with exit (and entry) options : alternative remedies for the exposure problem

Hu, Luke; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2012

Inspired by some spectrum auctions, we consider a stylized license auction with incumbents and one entrant. Whereas the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009685869

License auctions with royalty contracts for losers

Giebe, Thomas; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2006

oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines elements of a license auction with royalty licensing by granting the losers … licensing without reducing bidders' surplus; therefore, it is more profitable than both standard license auctions and pure …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371073

Optimal bid disclosure in license auctions with downstream interaction

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2014

The literature on license auctions for process innovations in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010378352

License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers

Giebe, Thomas; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2007 - April (revised) 2007

. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more … profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed-fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365856

Licensing innovations : the case of the inside patent holder

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2015

The present paper reconsiders the inside innovators’ licensing problem under incomplete information. Employing an optimal mechanism design approach, we show that, contrary to what is claimed in the literature, the optimal mechanism may prescribe fixed fees, royalty rates lower than the cost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285324

Optimal Licensing of Technology in the Face of (Asymmetric) Competition

Fan, Cuihong - 2018

. In a first step we consider the standard case of one license and show that competition among potential licensees has a … sophisticated menu license auctions, and design a dynamic mechanism that is more profitable. In a second step we allow the licensor … to issue more than one license and introduce a globally optimal dynamic mechanism that extracts the maximum industry …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932334