We study games where voluntary contributions can be adjusted until a steady state is found. In consent games contributions start at zero and can be increased by consent, and in dissent games contributions start high and can be decreased by dissent. Equilibrium analysis predicts free riding in...

This paper proposes two generalization of the core and evaluates them on experimental data of assignment games (workers and firms negotiate wages and matching). The generalizations proposed allow for social utility components (e.g. altruism) and random utility components (e.g. logistic...

Experimental analyses of Shapley-Shubik assignment games revealed that the core prediction is biased. The competing hypotheses are that subjects either have interdependent preferences or a limited understanding of outcomes in alternative matches. To evaluate these hypotheses econometrically, we...

We analyze vertical structures where a regulated network operator serves n network users, and the network users compete in quantities for customers. We distinguish two cases: (i) none of the network users are related to the network operator (ownership unbundling), (ii) one of the network users...

European and national cartel authorities have required dominant national gas pipelines to auction off certain quantities (typically about 10 % of their sales) to competitors. Do such auctions really improve the competitiveness of the wholesale market? Based on a model where oligopolistic...

This paper proposes two generalization of the core and evaluates them on experimental data of assignment games (workers and firms negotiate wages and matching). The generalizations proposed allow for social utility components (e.g. altruism) and random utility components (e.g. logistic...

This paper considers a two-stage oligopoly model with downstream retailers and two types of transaction costs (in contracting retailers and in direct retailing). Our analysis shows how transaction costs affect vertical integration in a strategic model of oligopoly, and it relates transaction...

We study games where voluntary contributions can be adjusted until a steady state is found. In consent games contributions start at zero and can be increased by consent, and in dissent games contributions start high and can be decreased by dissent. Equilibrium analysis predicts free riding in...

European and national cartel authorities have required dominant national gas pipelines to auction off certain quantities (typically about 10 % of their sales) to competitors. Do such auctions really improve the competitiveness of the wholesale market? Based on a model where oligopolistic...

We analyze vertical structures where a regulated network operator serves n network users, and the network users compete in quantities for customers. We distinguish two cases: (i) none of the network users are related to the network operator (ownership unbundling), (ii) one of the network users...