Showing 1 - 10 of 691
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012616168
This paper analyzes criteria of fair division of a set of indivisible items among people whose revealed preferences are limited to rankings of the items and for whom no side payments are allowed. The criteria include refinements of Pareto optimality and envy-freeness as well as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005542789
In the first competitive election for President of the Social Choice and Welfare Society, the (official) approval-voting winner differed from the (hypothetical) Borda count winner, who was also the Condorcet winner. But because the election was essentially a toss-up, it is impossible to say who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369390
This paper focuses on the fair division of a set of indivisible items between two people when both have the same linear preference order on the items but may have different preferences over subsets of items. Surprisingly, divisions that are envy-free, Pareto-optimal, and ensure that the less...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369413
Riker's size principle for n-person zero-sum games predicts that winning coalitions that form will be minimal in that any player's defection will negate the coalition's winning status. Brams and Fishburn (1995) applied Riker's principle to weighted-majority voting games in which players have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369434
Riker's `size principle' predicts that only minimal winning coalitions (MWCs) will form in n-person zero-sum games that satisfy certain conditions. After summarizing the logic of this principle, a model is proposed in which n players can be ordered from most to least weighty. Two different kinds...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777910
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006901208
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006909528
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004049156
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005605657