When there are peer effects in education, private schools have an incentive to vary tuition to attract relatively able students. Epple and Romano (1998) develop a general equilibrium model characterizing equilibrium pricing and student selection into schools when peer effects are present. The...

When there are peer effects in education, private schools have an incentive to vary tuition to attract relatively able students. Epple and Romano (1998) develop a general equilibrium model characterizing equilibrium pricing and student selection into schools when peer effects are present. The...

Epple and Romano (1998) show equilibrium provision of education by public and private schools has the latter skim off the wealthiest and most-able students, and universal vouchers lead to further cream skimming. Here we study voucher design that injects private-school competition and increases...

We present an equilibrium model of the market for higher education. Our model simultaneously predicts student selection into institutions of higher education, financial aid, educational expenditures, and educational outcomes. We show that the model gives rise to a strict hierarchy of colleges...

We examine the practice of affirmative action and consequences of its proscription on the admission and tuition policies of institutions of higher education in a general equilibrium framework. Colleges are differentiated ex ante by endowments and compete for students that differ by race,...

In this paper, we present a general equilibrium model of the market for higher education. Our model simultaneously predicts student selection into institutions, financial aid, and educational outcomes. We show that the model gives rise to a strict hierarchy of colleges that differ by the...