In this paper, we introduce the concept of a comparison function, which is a mapping g that assigns numbers to ordered pairs of alternatives (x,y) with the property that g(x,y)=- g(y,x). The paper discusses how some well-known choice correspondences on tournaments such as the uncovered set, the...

We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

We present a simple voting environment with three candidates where the Condorcet winner exists. Under plurality rule, the derived game has a stable set where such a candidate is elected with probability one. However, no stable set of the approval game elects the Condorcet winner with positive...

Il saggio propone alcune riflessioni sulle culture politiche, giuridiche e sociologiche vicine al pensiero delle numerose e ostinate ricerche militanti di Bruno Trentin. Non si tratta di "saggiare" l’indiscutibile attualità dell’imponente corpus teorico trentiniano, quanto di partire dalle...