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In this paper we consider cooperative graph games being TU-games in which players cooperate if they are connected in the communication graph. We focus our attention to the average tree solutions introduced by Herings, van der Laan and Talman [6] and Herings, van der Laan, Talman and Yang [7]....
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Reciprocal preferences have been introduced in the literature of social choice theory in order to deal with preference intensities. They allow individuals to show preference intensities in the unit interval among each pair of options. In this framework, majority based on difference in support...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773133
Reciprocal preferences have been introduced in the literature of social choice theory in order to deal with preference intensities. They allow individuals to show preference intensities in the unit interval among each pair of options. In this framework, majority based on difference in support...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010899839
Van Damme and Weibull (1998, 2002) model the noise in games as endogenously determined tremble probabilities, by assuming that with some effort players can control the probability of implementing the intended strategy. Following their methodology, we derive logit-like adjustment rules for games...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010845491
This paper presents results on stochastic stability in evolutionary game theory. We will see that imitation processes with bounded memory and sampling (Josephson, Matros, 2004) select Pareto outcomes whereas Fictitious Play processes with bounded memory select risk-dominant outcomes in the sense...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011020448
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Fudenberg et Kreps (1993), Young (1993), et Sela et Herreiner (1999) ont souligné l'insuffisance du critère de convergence en croyances du processus de Fictitious Play dans un cadre d'apprentissage des équilibres de Nash. En conséquence, nous choisissons d'étudier la convergence en...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985385
We consider the class of (finite) spatial games. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player has a payoff of at least k is NP-complete as a function of the number of players. When each player has two strategies and the base game is an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005818473