We report laboratory experiments that use new, visually oriented software to explore the dynamics of 3x3 games with intransitive best responses. Each moment, each player is matched against the entire population, here 8 human subjects. A "heat map" offers instantaneous feedback on current profit...

The human tendency to cooperate with nonkin even in short-run relationships remains a puzzle. Recently it has been hypothesized that altruism may be a byproduct of “mentalizing”, the process of understanding and predicting the mental states of others. Another idea is based on sexual...

We propose a new concept for the analysis of games, the TASP, which gives a precise prediction about non-equilibrium play in games whose Nash equilibria are mixed and are unstable under fictitious play-like learning. We show that, when players learn using weighted stochastic fictitious play and...

We report experiments designed to test the theoretical possibility, first discovered by Shapley (1964), that in some games learning fails to converge to any equilibrium, either in terms of marginal frequencies or of average play. Subjects played repeatedly in fixed pairings one of two 3 ´ 3...

Society often allocates valuable resources - such as prestigious positions, salaries, or marriage partners - via tournament-like institutions. In such situations, inequality affects incentives to compete and hence has a direct effect on equilibrium choices and hence material outcomes. We...

Monotone ratio orderings are refinements of first order stochastic dominance that allow monotone comparative statics results in games of incomplete information. We develop analogous refinements for second order stochastic dominance based on the monotonicity of the cumulative probability ratio...

Fictitious play and ``gradient'' learning are examined in the context of a large population where agents are repeatedly randomly matched. We show that the aggregation of this learning behaviour can be qualitatively different from learning at the level of the individual. This aggregate dynamic...

Fictitious play and "gradient" learning are examined in the context of a large population where agents are repeatedly randomly matched. We show that the aggregation of this learning behaviour can be qualitatively di®erent from learning at the level of the individual. This aggregate dynamic...