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This paper examines the irreversible adoption of a technology whose returns are uncertain, when there is an advantage to being the first adopter, but a network advantage to adopting when others also do so. Two patterns of adoption emerge: sequential, in which the leader aggressively preempts its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009485039
This paper shows that incomplete information and sufficient heterogeneity of players can ensure uniqueness in interaction games. In contrast to recent work on uniqueness in interaction games, we do not require strategic complementarity. There are two parts to the argument. First, if a player's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494293
There has been a recent economic literature arguing that international environmental agreements (IEAs) can have no real effect, on account of their voluntary and self-enforcing nature. This literature concludes that the terms of IEAs are the codification of the noncooperative equilibrium, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335749
New technology and improved access to the internet have led to a proliferation of information and new opportunities in the field of education. This working paper addresses the enormous impact information and communication technology has had on education and training as well as the benefits,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009636110
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004340042
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005485438
This paper provides a sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, which is in monotone pure strategies, in games of incomplete information. First, we show that if each player’s incremental ex post payoff is uniformly increasing in its own action and type, and its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005401164
This paper shows that incomplete information and sufficient heterogeneity of players can ensure uniqueness in interaction games. In contrast to recent work on uniqueness in interaction games, we do not require strategic complementarity. There are two parts to the argument. First, if a player’s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005404558
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413750
We analyse a simple model of dynamic moral hazard in which there is a clear and tractable trade-off between static and dynamic incentives. In our model, a principal wants an agent to complete a project. The agent undertakes unobservable effort, which affects in each period the probability that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883459