We analyze interactions between economics and ecology for ecosystem service markets under no-net-loss regulation. Previous studies of no-net-loss regulation address the ecological efficacy and valuation of restoration but largely ignore the effects of market dynamics. We link an economic model...

We extend the analysis of optimal scale in pollution permit markets by allowing for both market power and private information. We characterize the total costs (abatement costs and damages) under market power and private information and compare them to total costs under competition. It is...

Compliance links between CO2 emission trading programs--where firms regulated under one region's tradable permit program can comply using permits from another region, and vice-versa--are beginning to arise as a vehicle to lower costs, increase liquidity, and strengthen institutions while...

Links between emission trading programs are not immutable, as highlighted by New Jersey's exit from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. This raises the question of what to do with existing permits that are banked for future use--choices that have consequences for market behavior in advance...

We study strategic choice of effort in best-of-three contests between equally skilled players. Economic theory predicts such contests are more likely to end in two rounds than in three. If, however, a contest reaches a third round, each player is equally likely to win. We test these predictions...

We analyze a novel method for improving the efficiency of pollution permit markets by optimizing the way in which emissions are exchanged through trade. Under full-information, it is optimal for emissions to exchange according to the ratio of marginal damages. However, under a canonical model...