An uncertain and not just risky situation may be modeled using so-called belief functions assigning lower probabilities to events, that is, to sets of possible outcomes. In this paper we introduce an axiom of consistency by which we extend the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory to...

This article analyzes the fictitious play process originally proposed for strategic form games by Brown (1951) and Robinson (1951). We interpret the process as a model of preplay thinking performed by players before acting in a one-shot game. This model is one of bounded rationality. We discuss...

This paper presents a learning process which is a generalization of the method of fictitious play of Brown. If the learning process converges, the convergence point is a Nash equilibrium. We study 2 × 2 games. Here the process always converges. The relation between the initial prior, the weight...

We report new results on a slightly generalized version of the classical learning process for games proposed by Brown (1951), and further analyzed by Robinson (1951), Miyasawa (1961) and Shapley (1964). the learning process rests on an exogenous prior distribution over strategies - a mixed...