We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics....

We study a class of population games called stable games. These games are characterized by self-defeating externalities: when agents revise their strategies, the improvements in the payoffs of strategies to which revising agents are switching are always exceeded by the improvements in the...

We consider four models of evolution and learning in games which rely on perturbations of payoffs, including stochastic fictitious play. In all cases, we establish global stability results for zerosum games, games with an interior ESS, potential games, and supermodular games.

We establish global convergence results for stochastic fictitious play for four classes of games: games with an interior ESS, zero sum games, potential games, and supermodular games. We do so by appealing to techniques from stochastic approximation theory, which relate the limit behavior of a...

We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics....