This paper on "resale price maintenance" (RPM) has three main parts: (i) Using a simple and parsimonious model, we show that even with only one retailer, a "supplier" or "manufacturer" (hereafter "Manu") should impose minimum-RPM under some circumstances but maximum-RPM in others. These two sets...

A manufacturer supplies a retailer who has private superior knowledge about three system parameters; namely, market size, market sensitivity, and her retail-processing cost. For each parameter, the manufacturer's imperfect knowledge is characterized by a subjective distribution. Should the...

A dominant retailer will purchase a newsvendor-type product from a manufacturer, who incurs a unit manufacturing cost k. The expected retail demand is a function of the unit retail price p. How should the retailer design her purchase contract? For this increasingly prevalent but inadequately...

Consider a dominated manufacturer ("Manu") supplying a dominant retailer ("Reta"). Manu knows the product's unit manufacturing cost (m) deterministically, whereas Reta knows it only in the form of an a priori subjective distribution . Reta may implement any one of four contract formats:...