In this paper, we consider a market of indivisible goods with middlemen as an assignment market. Initially, we show that the set of all imputations given by competitive equilibria of an assignment market with middlemen who trade a single unit of indivisible goods coincides with the core of the...

First, we investigate which type of the liability law that protects nuclear power plants against catastrophe is socially optimal. We show that when a firm with a few funds is managed under the strict liability, maximization of social welfare is impossible since the firm may not cope with the...

We propose a job matching model of intermediary labor markets by developing the seminal work of Kelso and Crawford. Using this model, we show that for an arbitrary fixed broker-fee rate, the salary-adjustment process converges to a core allocation in intermediary labor markets where high-skilled...

We propose a job matching model of intermediary labor markets by developing the seminal work of Kelso and Crawford (1982, Econometrica 50:1483-1504). Using this model, we show that there exists a brokerage-fee rate such that a modified salary-adjustment process yields a core allocation in which...

This study provides sufficient conditions for non-emptiness of the core of a market for indivisible commodities with middlemen. This market is formulated as a three-sided assignment game without sidepayments. Our conditions are characterized by special properties of three-sided assignment games...

This paper considers welfare allocation rules when cities far from a river basin share water resources. The underlying situation is that the cities share a pipe from the water source and they are willing to distribute the welfare produced by using water. I propose two welfare allocation rule:...

Rings of collusive bidders at an English auction frequently distribute collusive gains among ring members via sequences of knockouts. This paper presents a model of sequences of knockouts. I investigate the relationship between the distributive outcome of each sequence and each solution of...