We explore the separation of powers between the legislative and the executive branch of government as a way of overcoming the dynamic consistency problem of regulatory policy towards investment. We model the industry as a regulated duopoly. The incumbent is a vertically integrated firm that owns...

Abstract We investigate whether vertical separation reduces quality discrimination and increases welfare. Consider an industry consisting of a vertically integrated firm, the incumbent, and an independent retailer, the entrant, which requires access to the services of the incumbent's wholesaler....

We analyze the product differentiation decision of a downstream entrant that purchases access to a bottleneck input from one of two vertically integrated incumbents, who will compete with him in the downstream market. First, an entrant chooses his product, then the entrant negotiates the access...

In this paper, we discuss the role of cable television networks and their ownership structure in promoting competition in the local access market. First, we show that the dual ownership of a local telephone network and a cable network, compared with separate ownership, may increase or decrease...

We evaluate the impact on market power and efficiency of a series of mergers on three Portuguese non-life insurance markets. We specify and estimate, with a panel of firm-level data, a structural model which includes: preferences, technology, and a market equilibrium condition. Firms' demand...

We evaluate the impact on market power and efficiency of a series of mergers on three Portuguese non-life insurance markets. We specify and estimate, with a panel of firmlevel data, a structural model which includes: preferences, technology, and a market equilibrium condition. Firms’ demand...

We explore the separation of powers between the legislative and the executive branch of government as a way of overcoming the dynamic consistency problem of regulatory policy towards investment. We model the industry as a regulated duopoly. The incumbent is a vertically integrated firm that owns...

The European Commission believes that for the regulation of next generation fixed telecommunications networks the continuity approach is preferable to the equality of access approach and the no-regulation approach. According to the European Commission, (i) functional separation eliminates...

We analyze the incentives of a telecommunications incumbent to invest and give access to a downstream entrant to a next generation network. We model the industry as a duopoly, where a vertically integrated incumbent and a downstream entrant, that requires access to the incumbent's network,...

We analyze the incentives of vertically integrated oligopolists to concede access to their bottleneck inputs to an entrant in the downstream market. First, two vertically integrated incumbents make access price offers to an entrant that chooses which one to accept, if any. Second, firms compete...