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managerial talent and are matched to assets in a competitive assignment model. The marginal impact of a CEO's talent is assumed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051232
Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008477185
closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509464
This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and … not affect pay. The strength of incentives depends only on the disutility of effort and is independent of risk and risk … aversion. If the CEO affects the volatility as well as mean of firm returns, incentives rise and are increasing in risk and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013095235
Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005059063
competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO%u2019s pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing … in CEO talent, which nonetheless justifies large pay differences. The data broadly support the model. The size of large …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005089117
in competitive market equilibrium. It embeds a modified principal-agent problem into a talent assignment model to …This paper presents a unified framework for understanding the determinants of both CEO incentives and total pay levels … endogenize both elements of compensation. The model's closed form solutions yield testable predictions for how incentives should …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005718277
), severance pay and debt compensation, and the insensitivity of incentives to risk … of incentives and their negative scaling with firm size, pay-for-luck, the widespread use of options (as opposed to stock …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012756520
force the contract to provide correct incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This tightly constrains the … examples relating to CEO incentives. In particular, the model derives predictions for the optimal measure of incentives and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012756568
embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model. By considering multiplicative specifications for the CEO … CEO's low fractional ownership (the Jensen-Murphy incentives measure) and its negative relationship with firm size can be … empirical measure of incentives. Third, incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012756843