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Essays on incongruent preferences for effort allocations in multi-task agency relations

Thiele, Veikko - 2006

Die Dissertation enthält drei Aufsätze, welche sich mit Prinzipal-Agenten Beziehungen in Verbindung mit moralischem Risiko beschäftigen. Dabei ist der Agent für die Ausführung von multiplen Aufgaben (Multitasking) verantwortlich. In dem ersten Aufsatz wird ein Prinzipal-Agenten Modell...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009467044

Performance Measurement in Multi-Task Agencies

Thiele, Veikko - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

This paper analyzes a multi-task agency model with a risk-neutral and financially constrained agent. The agent's performance evaluation is thereby incongruent, i.e. it does not perfectly reflect the relative contribution of the agent's multi-dimensional effort to firm's profit. This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621240

Task-Specific Abilities in Multi-Task Agency Relations

Thiele, Veikko - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

demonstrates how the provision of incentives - including the optimal aggregation of information - takes the agent's task …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005260345

Delegation and incentives

Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel - 2006

This paper analyses the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal / agent model by a …. The agent's subsequent choice of e ort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project. We nd that the … consideration of e ort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent. In fact, if …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010299113

An experimental study on social anchoring

Meub, Lukas; Proeger, Till - 2014

incentives for unbiased decisions and feedback on performance to more accurately implement market conditions. Despite these …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333234

You Don't Always Get What You Pay For

Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007

Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422168

Are groups 'less behavioral'? The case of anchoring

Meub, Lukas; Proeger, Till - 2016

Economic small group research points to groups as more rational decision-makers in numerous economic situations. However, no attempts have been made to investigate whether groups are affected similarly by behavioral biases that are pervasive for individuals. If groups were also able to more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011527050

Does Motivation Trigger Autonomy, or Vice Versa?

Petrova, Kameliia - EconWPA - 2005

Do firms use autonomy to motivate workers, or do they give autonomous jobs to workers who are already especially motivated? A standard result in economics is that firms offer autonomous jobs to promote worker motivation. But surprisingly, little attention has been given to the details of this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407531

An experimental study on social anchoring

Meub, Lukas; Proeger, Till - Center for European, Governance and Economic … - 2014

incentives for unbiased decisions and feedback on performance to more accurately implement market conditions. Despite these …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011104974

The implication of contracting out health care services: The case of service level agreements in Malawi

Mpakati Gama, Elvis; McPake, Barbara; Newlands, David - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

care services, qualitative evidence of perverse incentives for both parties to the contracting out programme and that some …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109136