Assuming that some investors value both financial advice and performance, but that the brokers needed to provide this advice are unwilling to recommend funds available at lower cost elsewhere, we predict that the market for mutual funds will be segmented. Segmentation forces fund families to...

We analyze the behavior of 401(k) plan participants during the first quarter of 2020, when COVID-19 generated historic volatility, large negative returns, and significant unemployment. Only 2.1% of participants invested in TDFs made any changes to their portfolios, with even lower rates of...

Oregon recently launched an automatic-enrollment retirement savings program for private sector workers lacking access to other workplace retirement plans. We analyze participation choices, account balances, and inflow/outflow data using administrative records between August 2018 and April 2020....

Oregon's Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) is a rich setting in which to study the effect of pension design on employer costs and employee retirement-timing decisions. PERS pays retirees the maximum benefit calculated using three formulas that can be characterized as defined benefit...

Financial economists have long been puzzled by investor demand for actively managed funds that generate, on average, negative after-fee, risk-adjusted returns. To shed new light on this puzzle, we exploit the fact that funds in different market segments compete for different types of retail...

The answer depends on how broker clients would have invested in the absence of broker recommendations. To identify counterfactual retirement portfolios, we exploit time-series variation in access to brokers by new plan participants. When brokers are available, they are chosen by new participants...