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Smith, Adam C.; Houser, Daniel; Leeson, Peter T.; … - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 97 (2014) C, pp. 61-71

Violent conflict destroys resources. It generates “destruction costs.” These costs have an important effect on … individuals’ decisions to cooperate or conflict. We develop two models of conflict: one in which conflict's destruction costs are … independent of individuals’ investments in “arms”—the tools of conflict—and another in which conflict's destruction costs depend …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048222

Chapter 22 Economics of Conflict: An Overview

Garfinkel, Michelle R.; Skaperdas, Stergios - In: Handbook of defense economics : volume 2, Defense in a …, (pp. 649-709). 2007

In this chapter, we review the recent literature on conflict and appropriation. Allowing for the possibility of … conflict, which amounts to recognizing the possibility that property rights are not perfectly and costlessly enforced … technologies of conflict. A central objective of this research is to identify the effects of conflict on economic outcomes: the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024407

The costs of conflict

Smith, Adam; Houser, Daniel; Leeson, Peter T.; Ostad, Ramin - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 97 (2014), pp. 61-71

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339123

Resolving persistent uncertainty by self-organized consensus to mitigate market bubbles

Sornette, Didier; Andraszewicz, Sandra; Murphy, Ryan O.; … - 2016

We propose a new paradigm to study coordination in complex social systems, such as financial markets, that accounts for fundamental uncertainty. This new context has features from prediction markets that have been shown previously to mitigate price bubbles in classical asset market experiments....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514493

Voting on a sharing norm in a dictator game

Vanberg, Christoph - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

I conduct an experiment to assess whether majority voting on a nonbindingsharing norm affects subsequent behavior in a dictator game. Ina baseline treatment, subjects play a one shot dictator game. In a votingtreatment, subjects are first placed behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ and vote onthe...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866591

The Decision Maker Matters: Individual versus Group Behaviour in Experimental Beauty-Contest Games

Kocher, Martin G.; Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004

Economics has devoted little attention so far as to whether the type of decision maker matters for economic decisions. However, many important decisions like those on monetary policy or a company’s business strategy are made by (small) groups rather than an individual. We compare behaviour of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866848

Step-Level Public Goods: Experimental Evidence

Rau, Holger Andreas; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2011

We analyze the provision of a step-level public good in an experiment. Specifically, we investigate how the order of moves and the introduction of a second step-level affects public-good provision. We find that the sequential-move game improves public-good provision and payoffs. An additional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305945

Simultaneous and sequential contributions to step-level public goods: One vs. two provision levels

Normann, Hans-Theo; Rau, Holger A. - 2014

In a step-level public-good experiment, we investigate how the order of moves (simultaneous vs. sequential) and the number of step levels (one vs. two) affects public-good provision in a two-player game. We find that the sequential order of moves significantly improves public-good provision and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333112

Flip a coin or vote: An experiment on choosing group decision

Hoffmann, Timo; Renes, Sander - 2016

Before a group can take a decision, its members must agree on a mechanism to aggregate individual preferences. In this paper we present the results of an experiment on the influence of private payoff information and the role of the available alternatives on individuals' mechanism choices in such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011588690

Voting rules and endogenous trading institutions: An experimental study

Søberg, Morten - 2002

This paper reports on recurring laboratory elections in which buyers and sellers choose institutional rules to govern a subsequent trading round. The bid auction (buyers propose prices), offer auction (sellers suggest prices) and double auction (both trader types initiate price quotes) make up...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284388