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A decision-maker exhibits preference for flexibility if he always prefers any set of alternatives to its subsets, even when two of them contain the same best element. Desire for flexibility can be explained as the consequence of the agent's uncertainty along a two-stage process, where he must...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773127
A decision-maker exhibits preference for flexibility if he always prefers any set of alternatives to its subsets, even when two of them contain the same best element. Desire for flexibility can be explained as the consequence of the agent’s uncertainty along a two-stage process, where he must...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011065375
A decision-maker exhibits preference for flexibility if he always prefers any set of alternatives to its subsets, even when two of them contain the same best element. Desire for flexibility can be explained as the consequence of the agent’s uncertainty along a two-stage process, where he must...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005818487
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009806256
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001717399
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A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. But in many cases it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168498
A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of definition. For the same reason, different conditions may be equivalent for functions defined on some domains, while different in other cases. Understanding the role of domains is therefore a crucial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399120
We consider situations in which agents are not able to completely distinguish between all alternatives. Preferences respect individual objective indifferences if any two alternatives are indifferent whenever an agent cannot distinguish between them. We present necessary and sufficient conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584601
In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be ìresting pointsî for a game in the way stable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584602