purposes of punishment, deterrence and special prevention. We investigate Bentham's intuition in a public goods lab experiment … prevention effect but show that the deterrence effect is smaller the more information on individual punishment is available. …The most famous element in Bentham's theory of punishment, the Panopticon Prison, expresses his view of the two …

purposes of punishment, deterrence and special prevention. This paper inves-tigates Bentham’s intuition in a public goods lab … experiment, by manipulating how much infor-mation on punishment experienced by others is available to would-be offenders …The most famous element in Bentham’s theory of punishment, the Panopticon Prison, expresses his view of the two …

) there is preference uncertainty. In a linear public good with punishment meted out by a disinterested participant, I test … two implications of the model: (a) participants increase contributions in reaction to imperfect punishment; (b) imperfect … punishment helps sustain cooperation if participants experience free-riding …

purposes of punishment, deterrence and special prevention. We investigate Bentham's intuition in a public goods lab experiment …. -- Punishment ; Deterrence ; Special Prevention ; Jeremy Bentham ; Experiment ; Public Good … prevention effect but show that the deterrence effect is smaller the more information on individual punishment is available …

, even if punishment is costly. However, these studies focus on situations where there is no uncertainty about others …' behavior. We investigate punishment in a world with “reasonable doubt” about others' contributions. Interestingly, people … level of a setting without punishment. Our findings suggest that sufficient information accuracy about others' behavior is …

punishment helps sustain cooperation if participants experience free-riding. -- deterrence ; public good experiment ; inequity …) there is preference uncertainty. In a linear public good with punishment meted out by a disinterested participant, I test … two implications of the model: (a) participants increase contributions in reaction to imperfect punishment; (b) imperfect …

, even if punishment is costly. However, these studies focus on situations where there is no uncertainty about others …' behavior. We investigate punishment in a world with “reasonable doubt” about others' contributions. Interestingly, people … some non-trivial degree of noise, punishment (1) cannot maintain high contributions and (2) reduces welfare even below the …

, even if punishment is costly. However, these studies focus on situations where there is no uncertainty about others …' behavior. We investigate punishment in a world with “reasonable doubt” about others' contributions. Interestingly, people … level of a setting without punishment. Our findings suggest that sufficient information accuracy about others' behavior is …

) there is preference uncertainty. In a linear public good with punishment meted out by a disinterested participant, I test … two implications of the model: (a) participants increase contributions in reaction to imperfect punishment; (b) imperfect … punishment helps sustain cooperation if participants experience free-riding …