can be sustained by reputation motives in spite of the inherent conflict of interests between sellers and buyers. In the … absence of “commitment” types, reputation motives are explained as a consequence of equilibrium interplay between the market …, reputation motives do not disappear even after the seller’s ability is revealed. This model is applied to examine the extent to …

I study reputation models in which information about the long-run player's past behavior is dispersed among short …-run players. I identify two challenges to reputation building when such information is aggregated via the short-run players …-run player's current period action, I propose a resistent to learning condition under which reputation fails. This is because the …

To analyze strategic interactions arising in the cyber-security context, we develop a new reputation game model in …

remains unclear. In each of six treatments that vary the cooperation premium and the informational basis for reputation … forces of (a) learning about the benefits of reputation, and (b) learning about backward unraveling. We find, inter alia …, that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in reputation grows across sets of finitely …

Building on the seminal paper of Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), I study the role of reputation building on … foreclosure in laboratory experiments. In one-shot interactions, upstream firms can choose to build a reputation by revealing … their price history to the current upstream competitor. In particular, integrated firms can establish a reputation to …