I describe a classroom tool that I believe is helpful in the teaching of microeconomics. It is potentially usefull in microeconomics and urban economics courses in a an economics departmen, but also in microeconomics cours in a variety of professional programs, such as in city and regional...

By providing incentives for sellers to act in a trustworthy manner, reputation mechanisms in many online environments can mitigate moral-hazard problems when particular buyers and sellers interact infrequently. However, these mechanisms rely on buyers sharing their private information about...

A model which explains, at a primitive level, the coexistence of money and credit, even though buyers prefer credit, an which allows the study of the interaction of money and credit is introduced. This is done in a setting with ongoing relations between sellers and untrustworthy buyers in which...

This paper introduces a matching model of credit and exchange in which potentiel difficulties in the enforcement of contracts play a central role. The repeated games framework that is developed is used to analyze the pricing and availability of credit, the consequences of information monopoly in...