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Optimal Financial Contracts with Hidden Effort, Unobservable Profits and Endogenous Costs of Effort

Dang, Viet Anh - 2010

effort choices and profits are unobservable and non-verifiable. The optimal financial contract must induce both the high … effort level and truthful revelation of profits. The paper further analyses the structure of the optimal contract where the … finding shows that under well-defined conditions, the optimal contract that solves a model with non-verifiable profits also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013149813

Optimal incentives and securitization of defaultable assets

Malamud, Semyon; Rui, Huaxia; Whinston, Andrew B. - In: Journal of financial economics 107 (2013) 1, pp. 111-135

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009715167

Optimal securitization with moral hazard

Hartman-Glaser, Barney; Piskorski, Tomasz; Tchistyi, Alexei - In: Journal of financial economics 104 (2012) 1, pp. 186-202

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009550139

Unobservable costly effort in security design

Robertson, Matthew J. - In: Economics letters 235 (2024), pp. 1-6

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015071431

Separation of ownership and control : delegation as a commitment device

Boukouras, Aristotelis - 2011

This paper provides a theoretical model for explaining the separation of ownership and control in firms. An entrepreneur hires a worker, whose effort is necessary for running a project. The worker's effort determines the probability that the project will be completed on time, but the worker...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010348626