Platforms care about the quality of components they host. For example, a computer operating system is more popular - and thus more profitable - when the software is high quality. Some platforms offer special arrangements to high-quality firms - for example, Apple promotes high-quality Macintosh...

This paper studies the equilibrium incentives of an upstream manufacturer to adopt exclusive retailing (ER). ER eliminates disciplining intrabrand competition between retailers, gives the exclusive retailer market power and a higher retail margin. On the one hand, the additional margin gives the...

This paper studies asymmetric platforms' incentives for enforcing exclusivity on multihoming sellers. We show that exclusivity benefits a platform only when its service is not very valuable to sellers, and hence can be initiated by a weak platform rather than the stronger one. It is possible for...

Our study extends the empirical literature on whether vertical restraints are anticompetitive. We focus on exclusive contracting in platform markets, which feature indirect network effects and thus are susceptible to applications barriers to entry. Theory suggests that exclusive contracts in...