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also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness in metric environments with indivisible projects, where we also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008752111
also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness on metric environments with indivisible projects. To do so, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836134
This chapter surveys recent models of coalition and network formation in a unified framework. Comparisons are drawn among various procedures of network and coalition formation, involving simultaneous and sequential moves. The survey also covers models of group and network formation by farsighted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025687
the number of coalitions can vary and membership exclusion is not granted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013082355
structures under the following three rules of coalition formation: the Open Membership game of Yi and Shin 1995 , the Coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215432
We study the formation of a ruling coalition in political environments. Each individual is endowed with a level of political power. The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals in the society and decides the distribution of resources. A ruling coalition needs to contain enough...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086580
This paper explores the existence of stable research teams, when each agent's preferences depend on the set of researchers collaborating with her. We introduce a property over researchers' preferences, called tops responsiveness guaranteeing the existence of stable research teams configurations....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005650012
of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682977
In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be ìresting pointsî for a game in the way stable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851378
In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that “solutions” to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be “resting points” for a game in the way...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005184889