We present experiments on repeated non-cooperative network formation games, based on Bala and Goyal (2000). We treat … coordination problems. We conduct experiments under various conditions which control for salient labeling and learning dynamics …. Contrary to previous experiments, we find that coordination on non-empty Strict Nash equilibria is not an easy task for …

We present experiments on repeated non-cooperative network formation games, based on Bala and Goyal (2000). We treat … coordination problems. We conduct experiments under various conditions which control for salient labeling and learning dynamics …. Contrary to previous experiments, we find that coordination on non-empty Strict Nash equilibria is not an easy task for …

reminiscent of some real-world features. Collections of smaller disjoint networks connecting only a few agents are more common … than global networks connecting all the agents in a community. Differences within a connected component such as the centre …

according to a better reply dynamics. In the long run the system settles in a state that consists of starred-wheel networks …. This is reminiscent of some real world features. Collections of smaller disjoint networks connecting few agents are more … common than global networks connecting all agents of the community. Di.erences within a connected component such as core and …

"level-k" thinking, which describes behavior in many experiments with complete-information games. We derive the model … Rabin's (2005) "cursed equilibrium," and evaluate the model's potential to explain behavior in auction experiments. The … distributions used in most experiments. …

non-neutrally, equilibrium ignores such framing. This paper reconsiders the results of experiments by Rubinstein, Tversky …

We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici- pants interact with their …

generosity with a sequence of dictator games conducted in the field. We find that networks of different dimensions differ … substantially in density, clustering, and centrality. When relating generosity to networks we observe that social distance only …