We present a dynamic general equilibrium model with agency costs, where heterogeneous firms choose between two alternative instruments of external finance - corporate bonds and bank loans. We characterize the financing choice of firms and the endogenous financial structure of the economy. The...

We present a DSGE model where firms optimally choose among alternative instruments of external finance. The model is used to explain the evolving composition of corporate debt during the financial crisis of 2008-09, namely the observed shift from bank finance to bond finance, at a time when the...

We determine the optimal combination of taxes on money, consumption and income in transactions technology models where exogenous government expenditures must be financed with distortionary taxes. We show that the optimal policy does not tax money, regardless of whether the government can use as...

In this paper we determine the optimal combination of taxes on money, consumption and income in transaction technology models. We show that the optimal policy does not tax money, regardless of whether the government can use the income tax, the consumption tax, or the two taxes jointly. These...

This paper shows that the conditions under which inflation-targeting interest rate rules lead to equilibrium uniqueness in a small open economy in general differ from those in a closed economy. As the monetary authority adjusts nominal interest rates in response to inflation, the real interest...

This paper presents an endogenous growth model with firms exhibiting external or internal increasing returns. Firms are either perfectly or monopolistically competitive. The paper extends fiscal policy results to cases where innovations are intentionally generated by firms. To provide...

Tax collection costs have been advocated in the literature as a reason to deviate from the Friedman rule, in standard general equilibrium monetary models with flexible prices. This paper shows that there are conditions under which the Friedman rule is optimal despite the presence of collection...