This paper addresses regulatory concerns that large shareholders of credit rating agencies may influence the rating process. Unlike S&P which is a privately held division of McGraw Hill, Moody's is a public company listed on the NYSE. Over the period 2001 to 2010, Moody's had two shareholders,...

In this paper, we examine the importance of contagion in earnings management, proxied by 2,376 earnings restatements announced during the years 1997-2008. Controlling for industry and firm-level characteristics, we find that firms are more likely to begin managing earnings after the public...

We investigate a prominent allegation in congressional hearings that Moody's loosened its rating standards to chase revenue after it went public in 2000. Consistent with this allegation, Moody's ratings for both corporate bonds and structured finance products are significantly more favorable to...

Recent frauds have questioned the efficacy of the SEC's enforcement program. We hypothesize that differences in firms' information sets about SEC enforcement and constraints facing the SEC affect firms' proclivity to adopt aggressive accounting practices. We find that firms located closer to the...

We argue that earnings management and fraudulent accounting have important economic consequences. In a model where the costs of earnings management are endogenous, we show that in equilibrium, bad managers hire and invest too much in order to pool with the good managers. This behavior distorts...

Using a regulatory version of TRACE data that include almost all primary and secondary market trades in corporate bonds over the period 2010-2017, we provide the first comprehensive study on the primary market for corporate bonds. Secondary market illiquidity can drive gains from primary market...

We study the consequences of earnings management for the allocation of resources among firms, and we argue that fraudulent accounting has important economic consequences. We first build a model where the costs of earnings management are endogenous, and we show that, in equilibrium, bad managers...

In a sample of 200 large Nasdaq firms we examine the determinants of stock option grants and study whether options are associated with superior firm performance. We find that firms grant options in the face of financial constraints, to give incentives to increase firm value, and to hire and...