We test for the effect of limited attention on the valuation of accruals by comparing the immediate and long-term market reactions to earnings announcements between a subsample of firms that disclose only the balance sheet with a subsample of firms that disclose both the balance sheet and the...

We investigate whether and when firms manage the tone of words in earnings press releases, and how investors react to tone management. We estimate abnormal positive tone, ABTONE, as a measure of tone management from residuals of a tone model that controls for firm quantitative fundamentals such...

We test whether earnings management (like a virus) spreads from firm to firm via board connections of shared directors (virus carriers). We use earnings restatements to identify firms that managed earnings and to identify the period when these firms manipulated earnings. We consider firms as...

Sometimes resources are badly employed because of coordination failures. Actions by decisionmakers that affect the likelihood of such failures cause ‘systemic risk.' We consider here the externality in the choice of ex ante risk management policies by individuals and firms: they are concerned...

Previous empirical work on adverse consequences of CEO overconfidence raises the question of why firms would hire overconfident managers. Theoretical research suggests a reason, that overconfidence can sometimes benefit shareholders by increasing investment in risky projects. Using options- and...