We hypothesize that firms structure their asset holdings so as to shelter assets from extraction by politicians and bureaucrats. Specifically, in countries where the threat of political extraction is higher, we hypothesize that firms will hold a lower fraction of their assets in liquid form....

We study how political factors can shape competition in the mobile telecommunication sector. We show that the way a government designs the rules of the game has an impact on concentration, competition, and prices. Pro-competition rules reduce prices, but do not hurt the quality of services or...

Using a newly assembled 50 country firm-level database spanning 19 years, we document a “bright side” for employees of business group affiliated firms: less pronounced fluctuations in employment than unaffiliated firms in response to macroeconomic shocks. The results are robust to a variety...

We use a multitude of tax reforms across OECD countries as natural experiments to estimate the market value of the tax benefits of debt financing. We report time-series evidence that tax reforms are followed by large changes in the value of corporate equity. However, the impact of tax reforms is...

We analyze the likelihood of government bailouts of a sample of 450 politically-connected (but publicly-traded) firms from 35 countries over the period 1997 through 2002. We find that politically-connected firms are significantly more likely to be bailed out than similar non-connected firms....