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subgroups. We investigate the occurrence of tacit and explicit collusion by allowing for communication within subgroups in one … symmetric collusive strategy for one subgroup, we find little evidence for tacit collusion, not even with increasing experience …. Only when explicit communication is allowed, collusion is established, and it becomes even more pronounced over time. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294803
subgroups. We investigate the occurrence of tacit and explicit collusion by allowing for communication within subgroups in one … symmetric collusive strategy for one subgroup, we find little evidence for tacit collusion. Only when explicit communication is … allowed, collusion is established. A behavioral model using quantal response equilibrium in which subjects have beliefs over …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988968
We assess the extent of preferences for employment in a collective wage bargaining situation with heterogeneous workers. We vary the size of the union and introduce a treatment mechanism transforming the voting game into an individual allocation task. Our results show that highly productive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427643
This paper analyzes responsibility attributions for outcomes of collective decision making processes. In particular, we ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process. We conduct an experimental voting game in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282471
We assess the extent of preferences for employment in a collective wage bargaining situation with heterogeneous workers. We vary the size of the union and introduce a treatment mechanism transforming the voting game into an individual allocation task. Our results show that highly productive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897346
This paper analyzes responsibility attributions for outcomes of collective decision making processes. In particular, we ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process. We conduct an experimental voting game in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272198
This paper analyzes responsibility attributions for outcomes of collective decision making processes. In particular, we ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process. We conduct an experimental voting game in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010243444
We assess the extent of preferences for employment in a collective wage bargaining situation with heterogeneous workers. We vary the size of the union and introduce a treatment mechanism transforming the voting game into an individual allocation task. Our results show that highly productive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009656202
Consider the problem of allocating k identical, indivisible objects among n agents, where k is less than n. The planner's objective is to give the objects to the top k valuation agents at zero costs to the planner and the agents. Each agent knows her own valuation of the object and whether it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005619604
goal in mind, we define collusion resistance as a criterion against disproportional power accumulation in Quadratic Funding … models that can arise from pre-existing participant relationships and argue that collusion resistant QF and plural QF are two … sides of the same coin. Next, we evaluate various iterations of Quadratic Funding, testing their collusion resistance and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014255237