We study optimal contracting in team settings, featuring stylized aspects of production environments with complex tasks. Agents have many opportunities to shirk, task-level monitoring is needed to provide useful incentives, and because it is difficult to write individual performance into formal...

We provide theoretical foundations for several common (nested) representations of intrinsic linear habit formation. These representations are dynamically consistent and additive, with geometrically decaying coefficients of habit formation. Our axiomatization introduces a revealed preference...

I use the theories of duality and optimal branchings to find a necessary and sufficient characterization of stochastically stable limit sets (SSLS) that helps improve the radius -- modified coradius test of Ellison (2000). The improved shortcut I offer may permit the identification of SSLS when...

We consider a multilateral Nash demand game where short-sighted players come to the bargaining table with requests for both coalition partners and the potentially generated resource. We prove that group learning leads with probability one to complete cooperation and a strictly self-enforcing...

This paper studies a class of multi-self decision-making models proposed in economics, psychology, and marketing. In this class, choices arise from the set-dependent aggregation of a collection of utility functions, where the aggregation procedure satisfies some simple properties. We propose a...