We model public choice in a number of cases where a government, since it cannot design an optimal policy as a whole, resorts to a sequential, myopic approach; and which is not free of error. We use this framework to explore governmental budgeting and welfare economics. We develop various...

We study different methods of immigration control using a simple model of a congested world. Our main comparison involves quotas, the predominant instrument of immigration control, and a proposed system of immigration tolls and emigration subsidies. We show that the equilibrium of the proposed...

We consider a world in which the mode of food production, foraging or agriculture, is endogenous, and in which technology grows exogenously. Within a model of coalition formation, we allow individuals to rationally form cooperative communities (bands) of foragers or farmers. At the lowest levels...

The authors study a simple model of tariff wars and trade deals in which government revenue collection and disbursement uses resources. The introduction of costly governments leads to lower non-cooperative tariffs, the possibility that a less costly government may win a tariff war, and fully...

We examine a model of a rich country with a redistributive public sector and facing costly immigration control. When illegal immigrants have access to the public sector we show that, as border control becomes more expensive, inequality in the rich country increases, redistributive transfers...