In the first chapter, ¡°All-Pay Auctions with Resale¡±, I study equilibria of first- and second-price all-pay auctions with resale when players' signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed. I show that existence of resale possibilities introduces an endogenous element to players'...

We study equilibria of first- and second-price all-pay auctions with resale when players’ signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed. We show that existence of resale possibilities introduces an endogenous element to players’ valuations and creates a signaling incentive for...

We study equilibria of first- and second-price all-pay auctions with resale when players’ signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed. We show that existence of resale possibilities introduces an endogenous element to players’ valuations and creates a signaling incentive for...

The fundamental question I address in the dissertation is how the behavior of economic agents interacts with networks of relationships which underlie a wide set of economic situations. In Ch. 2, entitled "Decentralized Information Sharing in Oligopoly," I analyze the incentives of firms for...

This dissertation consists of three chapters where the first two chapters study models ofbargaining over decision rights and the third chapter studies a model of contests.In the first chapter, "Selling Authority," I consider bargaining over decision-making authorityin which an informed but...

Informational assumptions are an important aspect of the study of auctions in economictheory. However, there has been limited research into how the assumptions made by theoristsimpact their results. I explore two different aspects of the information available to biddersin auctions. The...

This dissertation examines the reasons for which a seller may decide to conduct a multi-unit auction sequentially rather than simultaneously. It analyzes the manner in which the information generated during a sequential auction can affect bidding to the seller's benefit and demonstrates the...