The optimal reporting frequency is an important issue in accounting. In many production settings, substitution effects across periods occur. This paper shows that the optimal reporting frequency depends on the strength of the substitution effect and on the information content of performance...

Non–monotone incentive structures, which — according to theory — are able to induce optimal behavior, are often regarded as empirically less relevant for labor relationships. Scientific attention is (therefore) confined to monotone if not linear contracts. This paper reports on...

In this paper we test a dynamic agency model. The incentive compatible contract is non - monotone and does not award the highest pay to the most successful agent. Based on the assumption that agents are rational we expect them to choose high effort despite the non - monotonicity of the...

This paper explores whether an exchange featuring (almost) equal expected gains and expected losses for a trusting individual is evidence for high trust or low trust; I argue that such an exchange shows low trust. A simple trust measure is suggested which could be applied both in experimental...

The benefit of non-information rationing aggregate performance evaluation is studied in a limited commitment setting. Depending on the prior distribution of the managerial skill parameter, an equal bonus rule, that is intertemporal aggregation of performance measures, can be efficient as it...

In this paper we test a dynamic agency model. The incentive compatible contract is non-monotone and does not award the highest pay to the most successful agent. Based on the assumption that agents are rational we expect them to choose high effort despite the non-monotonicity of the...

Non-monotone incentive structures, which - according to theory - are able to induce optimal behavior, are often regarded as empirically less relevant for labor relationships. We compare the performance of a theoretically optimal non-monotone contract with a monotone one under controlled...