In symmetric games with externalities across coalitions, we investigate how three players form coalitions using two … solutions: 𝐧∗, which is a focal prediction of coalition structure in a class of noncooperative coalitional bargaining games … equilibrium coalition structure (based on the latter notion) is never finer than 𝐧∗, and we provide a sufficient and necessary …

continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from trade, and coalitions may create positive or negative externalities. The … bargaining solution, for games where the worth of all pairwise coalition is less than a third of the grand coalition value; the … Shapley value, for games where the sum of the value created by all pairwise coalitions is greater than the grand coalition …

This paper studies an extensive form game of coalition formation with random proposers in games with externalities. It … strong condition, the equilibrium coalition structure is not necessarily efficient. There may be multiple equilibria even in … the absence of externalities, and symmetric players are not necessarily treated symmetrically in equilibrium. If the grand …

. In particular, it is equivalent to the set of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston …