This paper considers the optimality of setting a secret reserve price in ascending auctions. Contrary to intuition, an ascending auction is no longer equivalent to a second price auction when the reserve price is secret. We determine the seller's optimal reserve price policy when the bidders'...

In this paper, we analyze factors which determine the optimal reserve price in a procurement reverse auction. In practice, professional purchasers rarely set a reserve price or determine it on more or less subjective criteria. The paper aims to give them a clear analysis on this point based on...

In this paper, we run a laboratory experiment to compare two mechanisms in a procurement setting: Right-of-First-Refusal (ROFR) where the incumbent supplier is granted a privileged position versus standard First-Price-Auction (FPA). To this end, we have subjects compete against a computerized...

In a procurement first-price sealed-bid auction with risk-averse suppliers, we determine the conditions under which the buyer has an incentive to grant a supplier a right of first refusal. We show that this clause can lower the buyer’s expected cost when suppliers (the incumbent and new...

[fre] Face au développement du commerce électronique, cet article étudie le fonctionnement des enchères sur internet dans le cadre du commerce entre entreprises (B2B), entre particuliers (C2C) et entre entreprises et particuliers (B2C). Il met en évidence les particu- larités de ces...

Nous analysons le problème de la formation d'une entente entre soumissionnaires à un appel d'offres au premier prix confrontés au risque d'être détecté. Considérant qu'une entente peut être détectée dès qu'un offreur est dénoncé, notre objectif est de déterminer l'influence de ce...