bidders. In our experiment participants face four auction types (first versus second price - auction versus fair division game … games the object is owned by the group of bidders. Consequently the auction's revenue is equally distributed among all …

allocation rules (first- vs. second-price - auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private value …

allocation rules (first- vs. second-price - auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private value …

allocation rules (first vs. second price auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private value …

’ bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price … auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities …

stability and fairness. Nevertheless, some auction outcome must be chosen. We separate deviations into two types: deviations by …

-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms …

' bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first-price auction …

An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected … externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another … example are cross-shareholdings between companies that compete in an auction. We derive an auction that coincides with the SPA …

ensuing auction, leading to loss of efficiency and eliminating the revenue dominance typically observed in firstprice auctions. …