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This paper characterizes the class of communication networks for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs … common and independent beliefs and private values or a bad outcome, we show that if the communication network is 2-connected … directly connected to the designer or indirectly connected to the designer through at least two disjoint paths. We couple …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003795217
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This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We … characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive … on a given communication network, in all environments with either common independent beliefs and private values or a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014213825
other hand the decision makers rely too much on the received information. Moreover, communication as well as payoffs … communication is less biased. In all treatments, however, the messages are more precise than theoretically predicted. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260085
Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? In this paper the principal's evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. I show that the principal explains her evaluation to the agent if the evaluation turns out to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569527
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Depending on the context at hand, people's preference for receiving feedback might differ. Especially in allocation decisions that directly concern another individual, feedback from the affected person can have positive or negative value. We study such preferences in a laboratory experiment by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012169494
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We develop a theory of conversations. Two agents with different interests take turns choosing the topic of the conversation. Talking about a single topic allows them to delve deeper, making the conversation more informative (or enjoyable). To capture this dynamic, we assume that the marginal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013543005