Different information provision in experimental markets can drastically change subjects' behavior. Considering the repeated Bertrand duopoly game of Dufwenberg and Gneezy [Dufwenberg, M., Gneezy's, U., 2000. Price competition and market concentration: an experimental study. International Journal...

Die Verhaltensökonomie und ihre praktischen Implikationen geraten immer stärker in den Fokus auch der deutschen Politik. Individuelle Entscheidungen sollen im Sinne eines "libertären Paternalismus" sanft beeinflusst werden. Die „Nudges“ bestehen in Standardvorgaben, Selbstbindungen und...

Using a symmetric 2-person prisoners’ dilemma as the base game, each playerreceives a signal for the number of rounds to be played with the same partner.The actual number of rounds (the length of the supergame) is determined bythe maximal signal where each player expects the other’s signal...

This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude...

This paper considers the stability of tacit collusion in price setting duopolies with repeated interaction. The minimum discount factor above which tacit collusion can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium is called the critical discount factor delta*. In addition, delta* is often used...

Different information provision in experimental markets can drastically change subjects' behavior. Considering the repeated Bertrand duopoly game of Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), we find that population feedback about the prices in other markets outside a subjects' own current market causes...