We study the optimal manipulation rules of a public firm’s objective function in a mixed duopoly with imperfect product substitutability. We compare the solutions under quantity and price competition, and the way in which they are affected by the degree of product substitutability. This...

We examine both quantity and price competition between a number of profit-maximizing firms and a state-controlled enterprise (SCE). The objective function of the latter is strategically defined by a welfare-maximizing government which weighs the SCE’s profits relative to consumer surplus and...

The paper shows that strategic quantity competition can be characterized by behavioral heterogeneity, once competing firms are allowed in a pre-market stage to optimally choose the behavioral rule they will follow in their strategic choice of quantities. In particular, partitions of the...

Within a strategic delegation model, this paper examines in a quantity setting oligopoly framework the determinants of the degree of strategic delegation - the latter being defined as the extent of the departure from pure profit maximization. The sub-game perfect equilibrium degree of strategic...

The paper investigates both quantity and price oligopoly games in markets with a variable number of managerial and entrepreneurial firms which defines market structure. Following Vickers (Economic Journal, 1985) which establishes an equivalence between the equilibrium under unilateral delegation...

In this paper we extend the analysis of the standard model of spatial discrimination with quantity competition along the linear city to the case in which the unit transportation cost is greater than one. We show that in such a case the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in locations is a...

We enquiry about the effects of first and second order stochastic dominance shifts of the distribution of the consumers’ willingness to pay, within the standard model of a market with network externalities and hump-shaped demand curve. This issue is analyzed in the polar cases of perfect...

This paper investigates the endogenous choice of the strategic variable, price or quantity, taken in a mixed duopoly by a public and a private firm prior to market competition. While Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) in a standard mixed duopoly find that price is the unique equilibrium, we show that,...