In this paper we present a model of spatial competition that highlights firms' customization strategies in an imperfect competitive environment. The nature of competition in markets with products designed according to consumer preferences is discussed both in a framework of exogenous and...

Vertical integration in an environment without foreclosure, or more generally without any mechanisms that restrict competition among firms, and subsidization of firms' production are two separate mechanisms that raise consumer welfare, and both have been proposed as antidotes to certain aspects...

We consider a quantity-location duopoly game in a spatial discrimination model in which we assume that the delivered goods can be imperfect substitutes or complements. The paper extends the analysis by Shimizu [Economics Letters 76 (2002)] who provides arguments to exclude the possibility for...

It is widely believed that vertical integration in an environment without foreclosure, or more generally without any mechanism that restricts competition among firms, raises the welfare of consumers. In this paper we show that this can be overturned in a standard setting. We consider a vertical...

In a context of product innovation, we study two-part tariff licensing between a patentee and a potential rival which compete in a differentiated product market characterized by network externalities. The latter are shown to crucially affect the relative profitability of Cournot vs. Bertrand...