Similar Search Results

Career concerns and performance reporting in optimal incentive contracts

Wolitzky, Alexander - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 12 (2012) 1, pp. 1-30

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010007726

Dynamic monopoly with relational incentives

Wolitzky, Alexander - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 5 (2010) 3, pp. 479-518

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009947831

Indeterminancy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts

Wolitzky, Alexander - In: Games and economic behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 595-607

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009379526

Endogenous institutions and political extremism

Wolitzky, Alexander - In: Games and economic behavior 81 (2013), pp. 86-100

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358105

Fully sincere voting

Wolitzky, Alexander - In: Games and economic behavior 67 (2009) 2, pp. 720-735

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909325

Career concerns and performance reporting in optimal incentive contracts

Wolitzky, Alexander - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 12 (2012) 1, pp. 1-30

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009545841

Dynamic monopoly with relational incentives

Wolitzky, Alexander - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 5 (2010) 3, pp. 479-518

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009124816

Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks

Wolitzky, Alexander - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 10 (2015) 1, pp. 67-101

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010528228

Mechanism design with maxmin agents : theory and and an application to bilateral trade

Wolitzky, Alexander - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 971-1004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011584288

Mechanism design with maxmin agents : theory and an application to bilateral trade

Wolitzky, Alexander - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 971-1004

This paper studies mechanism design when agents are maxmin expected utility maximizers. A first result gives a general necessary condition for a social choice rule to be implementable. The condition combines an inequality version of the standard envelope characterization of payoffs in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671855