In Man and Takayama (2013) (henceforth MT) we show that many classical impossibility theorems follow from three simple and intuitive axioms on the social choice correspondence when the set of social alternatives is finite. This note extends the main theorem (Theorem 1) in MT to the case where...

This paper identifies and illuminates a common impossibility principle underlying a number of impossibility theorems in social choice. We consider social choice correspondences assigning a choice set to each non-empty subset of social alternatives. Three simple axioms are imposed as follows:...

This paper considers social choice correspondences assigning a choice set to each non-empty subset of social alternatives. We impose three requirements on these correspondences: unanimity, independence of preferences over infeasible alternatives and choice consistency with respect to choices out...

We propose a game theoretic model of large elections that incorporates the assumption that mandate matters. This innovation is motivated by empirical evidence that US Representatives with larger victory margins on average vote in a more partisan manner. Without relying on preference for voting,...

Whether in electoral politics or promotions within organizations, players often face the dilemma of whether to enter the contest or to assist other candidates. This article analyzes incentives in a rank-order tournament when the winner has control over resources that he can distribute to his...